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Abstract 
Most of the environmental and non-attended applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN’s) need mobile sensor nodes. 
However, mobility of sensor nodes increases security issues in WSNs and it’s also vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. 
Dynamic WSN emerges two most common issues related to the authentication of moving sensor nodes and security in 
communication and key distribution. After possible movement of sensor node requires authenticating again and again from the 
base station or some other trusted nodes. Similarly, confidentiality in communication and key distribution is an important 
factoragainst man-in-middle type of attacks. Till the day most of the WSN’s security researchers concentrate on the static 
environment. Though there schemes are secure and efficient but not sufficient to secure mobile WSN’s environment. In this 
paper we have proposed a novel protocol framework and related mathematical model for secure routing layer communication and 
key distribution in mobile WSN’s. After that we apply this model for performance evaluation on the basis of static as well as 
dynamic scenario for different number of nodes which shows that our framework is satisfactorily suitable for dynamic WSNs 
applications.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the ICISP2015. 
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1. Introduction 
WSN’s domain has gained more popularity in research field. The reason behind this popularity is not only due to its 
applications but due to its co-domain fields also such as security, authentication, key management, routing, data 
aggregation, and disseminations etc.10.
Basically WSNs consist of heterogeneous4, 5 type of small devices that is sensor nodes those having small size, 
less memory6, 9, limited battery power like properties along with the sensing capabilities. Sensor nodes can sense its 
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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surrounding environment to collect information related to the events happening in its range and based on some set of 
rules they disseminate that information to the base station via a wireless medium.  
Most of the WSN’s researcher’s focuses on static sensor nodes which need one time authentication in WSNs. 
However dealing with mobile sensor nodes can pose different types of challenges and security related issues. 
Challenges are nothing but mobile node increases data transmission failure rate due to continuous route change in 
the network as well as increase in packet delivery delay which leads to bad affect in real time applications. 
Similarly, security related issues7 like mobile nodes need authentication and re-authentication due to change in 
region as well as they are very prone to various types of both active and passive attacks by attackers or intruders 
also.
Whenever a mobile sensor node (slave node) connects to the WSN then sink node (master node) has to 
authenticate that slave node. In case mobile node moves to the range of another master node, master node needs to 
authenticate that slave node again. Hence, in high mobility environment master nodes need to authenticate slave 
nodes again and again though it had authenticated before by any other master nodes in the same network. Similarly, 
for node to node communication privacy plays an important role because intruders can tamper in between 
communication and make damage by changing information. Dissemination of authenticated key in WSNs is one of 
the basic security problems. As sensor nodes are light-weight devices and have limited memory and limited 
computational power9, making the use of security protocols of other computer networks to WSNs is not enough. As 
a result, the primary issues in security researches on WSN are the design of resource-efficient security protocol. A 
number of approaches such as pre-distribution and hierarchical key management schemes, pair-wise key agreement 
and group based key agreement were introduced for the efficient authenticated key distribution1, 2, 8. So that our main 
goals are to reduce the load of frequent authentication, increase confidentiality and provide key freshness 
framework. 
This paper is organized into five sections. The previous section covers the Introduction. Next section describes 
the proposed protocol description. Section 3 explains actual mathematical model of proposed protocol framework 
for secure routing layer protocol. Section 4 describes performance evaluation and the final section concluded the 
paper. 
2. SRL protocol description 
In this section we have described our proposed protocol framework for secure routing layer communication and 
key distribution in dynamic WSNs. Figure 1 show the block diagram of our proposed protocol which consists of 
base station (BS), two master nodes (S1, S2) and a slave node (N). This framework is divided into five stages viz.  
a. Stage 0: Determination and Discovery of Master Nodes. 
b. Stage 1: Master Nodes Communication Set-up.  
c. Stage 2: Master Nodes Distribution of Authentication Keys.  
d. Stage 3: Primary Authentication of Slave Nodes.  
e. Stage 4: Secondary Authentication of Slave Nodes. 
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Figure 1: Block diagram of proposed framework 
2.1. Stage-0: Determination and discovery of master nodes 
In first stage where master nodes start to communicate with its 1 hop neighboring master nodes by broadcasting 
an authentication packet in WSNs. This authentication packet generally contains a hello message, a random number 
R and current timestamp, along with these things packet also contains a Message Authentication Hash Code (MAC 
hash code) to verify its confidentiality at receiver side. MAC hash code identify whether received packet is secure or 
some man-in-middle attack happened over there. The master node S1 generates an authentication packet which 
consists of R and its current timestamp T broadcasted in WSNs. 
2.2. Stage-1: Master nodes communication set-up 
Whenever a master node receives an authentication packet broadcasted by its neighboring master nodes, it 
initiates the process of communication set-up. Master node generates a new R. Along with newly generated R, 
master node sends a received authentication packet and MAChash code for verification purpose to the base station. 
On the other side base station verifies both authentication packets and generates two different response packets by 
exchanging random numbers received by both the authentication packets through which both the master nodes 
generate an integrity key by using one way key derivation function and received random numbers. 
In stage 0 and stage 1 the master node S2 generates an authentication packet which contains a new R with 
previous authentication packet of master node S1 and sends it to the base station BS. Base station in figure 3, after 
getting an authentication packet from master node S2 it generates two response packets RP for S1 and S2 by 
exchanging their random numbers to develop integrity key using one way key derivation function and received 
random numbers of S1 and S2. 
2.3. Stage-2: Master nodes distribution of authentication keys 
This is the stage where master nodes need to share authentication keys to its neighboring master nodes so that, it 
generates a two different seed values and send it to the respective neighboring master nodes. Master nodes who 
received those seed values then they generates authentication keys which will help in secondary slave node re-
authentication process. The master node S1 and S2 shares their seed values to generate an authentication keys for 
each other. 
2.4. Stage-3: Primary authentication of slave nodes 
This is an independent stage for primary authentication of slave nodes. If a slave node is not authenticated at all 
from any of the master node in WSN then there is need to authenticate slave node from that master node in the range 
slave node comes first. Whenever a slave node received broadcasted authentication packet of master node from 
stage 0 it generates a R. Slave node sends a response packet RP to the master node which contains newly generated 
R, authentication packet of master node and MAC hash code for verification purpose. After getting response packet 
from slave node a MAC hash code generated by master node for received packet and send it to the base station with 
response packet. Here, base station verifies the MAC hash codes of master and slave nodes and generates two 
response packets by exchanging their random numbers through which master node and slave node generates an 
authentication tickets and related MAC hash code. This is the way how slave node authenticated by a master node. 
2.5. Stage-4: Secondary authentication of slave node 
When slave node moves continuously in WSN and try to authenticate from other master nodes then stage-3 
process is necessary if and only if it is new master node or it is not neighbor of previous authenticated master node. 
Other than this only needs to re-authenticate slave node from neighbor master node. Whenever slave node N 
received an authentication packet of new master node it generates and sends a packet to new master node which 
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contains its authentication ticket of previous master node and MAChash code of its authentication ticket. Master 
node then provide a new authentication ticket to slave node on successful verification and this way slave node re-
authenticated by new master node. 
3. Proposed mathematical model for secure routing layer protocol 
Secure Routing Layer Protocol (SRLP) is our proposed protocol framework for secure routing layer 
communication and key distribution between master and slave nodes. Consider a WSN environment of 40 numbers 
of nodes placed in network randomly from which we have selected one node as base station some nodes as master 
nodes and others are slave nodes. 
Here P is the set of phases P= {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}
1. Stage-0 : P1 = {API, EI, MI}
Where,I = {1, 2, 3….10} 
P1 = Discovery and determination of master nodes. 
API = Authentication Packet of master nodes I. 
EI = Encrypted Packet of master node I.  
MI = MAC for master node I. 
API = SI+“HELLO”+EI+MI
SI = Identification of I
th master node. 
EI = RIْ
h:(h(EI)ْሺሻሻÆ
EI = EK (EIْሻ
Here, ൌǤ
ൌǤ
ൌǤ
ൌǤ
ǣÆǤ
2. Stage 1 : P2 = {P2(a), P2(b), P2(c), P2(d)}
Where,P2 = Master nodes communication setup. 
a) P2(a) = {APJ, EJ, MJ, MJ}
Where,J = {1, 2, 3….10} 
APJ = Authentication Packet of master nodes J. 
EJ = Encrypted Packet of master node J. 
MJ = MAC for master node J. 
APJ = SJ+BID+SI+MI+EJ+MJ
SJ = Identification of J
th master node. 
BID = Identification of base station. 
EJ = RJْ
h:(h(EJ)ْሺሻْሺሻْሺሻْሺሻሻÆ
EJ = EK (EJْሻ
Here, ൌǤ
ൌǤ
ǣÆ
ሻ P2(b) = {RPB, EBI, EBJ, MBI, MBJ}
RPB = Response Packet of base station for connection setup.
EBI = Encrypted Packet of base station for I
th master node.  
EBJ = Encrypted Packet of base station for J
th master node. 
MBI = MAC of base station for I
th master node. 
MBJ = MAC of base station for J
th master node. 
RPB= BID+SJ+SI+EBJ+MBI+MBJ
DK (EJْሻÆ
If MJ = h(h(SJْBIDْSIْEJْMI))
EIْÆ
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If MI = h(h(EIْSI))
EIْÆ
EBI = RJْ
h: (h(BID)ْሺSJ)ْሺEBI))Æ MBI
EBJ = RIْEB1
h:(h(BID)ْሺSJ)ْh(RJሻْሺEBJ)ْh(MBI)) Æ MBJ
EBI=EK (EBIْሻ
EBJ=EK (EBJْሻ
ǣÆ
ሻ P2(c) = {RPJI, KIJ, IKIJ, MJI}
RPJI = Response Packet of J
th master node for Ith master node.
KIJ = Shared encryption key of I
th and Jth master node. 
IKIJ = Integrity Key of I
th and Jth master node. 
MJI = MAC of J
th master node for Ith master node. 
RPJI = SJ+SI+EBI+MBI+MJI
ൌሺሺሻْሺሻْሺሻْሺሻْሺሻሻ
DK (EBJْሻÆ
KIJ = KF (0ْRIْRJ)
IKIJ = KF (1ْRIْRJ)
h:(h(SJ)ْh(SI)ْh(RI)ْh(RJ))ÆMJI
SJ: RPJIÆ SI
d) P2(d) = {ACKC, KIJ, IKIJ, MIJ}
ACKC = Acknowledgment packet for communication setup. 
MIJ = MAC of I
th master node for Jth master node. 
ACKC = SI+SJ+”ACK”+MIJ
If MJI=h(h(SJ)ْh(SI)ْh(RI)ْh(RJ)) 
DK (EBIْሻÆ
KIJ = KF (0ْRIْRJ)
IKIJ = KF (1ْRIْRJ)
h: (h(SI)ْh(SJ)ْh(RI)ْh(RJ)) Æ MIJ
SI: ACKCÆ SJ
3. Stage 2 : P3 = {P3(a), P3(b)}
Where,P3 = Master node’s distribution of authentication key. 
a) P3(a) = {AKPI , EAI, MAI}
AKPI = Authentication Key Packet of master node I. 
EAI = Encrypted authentication key packet of I
th master node. 
MAI = MAC for an authentication key packet of I
th master node. 
AKPI = SI+SJ+EAI+MAI
EAI = RASEEDْRAI
h: (h(SI)ْh(SJ)ْh(EAI)) Æ MAI
EAI = EK (SIْEAI)
Here,RASEED = Random seed value of I
th master node. 
RAI = Random number of I
th master node. 
SI: AKPIÆ SJ
b) P3(b) = {RKPJ, AKI, AIKI, MAJ}
RKPJ = Response Key Packet of J
th master node. 
AKI = Authentication Key of I
th master node. 
AIKI = Integrity Authentication Key of I
th master node. 
MAJ = MAC for response key packet of J
th master node. 
RKPJ = SJ+൅ǳǳ൅MAJ
If MA1 = h(h(SI)ْh(SJ)ْh(EAI))
DK (EAIْሻÆ
RASEED = ْ
AKI = KF (0ْRASEED)
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AIKI = KF (1ْRASEED)
h: (h (SI)ْh(SJ)ْh(AIKI)) Æ MAJ
SJ: RKPJÆ SI
4. Stage 3 : P4 = {P4(a), P4(b), P4(c), P4(d), P4(e)}
Where,P4= Primary authentication of slave node. 
a) P4(a) = {APN, EN, MN}
N = {11, 12…39} 
APN = Authentication packet of N
th slave node. 
EN = Encrypted packet of N
th slave node. 
MN = MAC of N
th slave node. 
APN = SN+SI+EN+MN
SN = Identification of N
th slave node. 
EN = RNْْ
h: (h(SN)ْh(SI)ْh(EN)) Æ MN
SN: APNÆ SI
b) P4(b) = {APNI, MNI}
APNI = Primary authentication packet of I
th master node for Nth slave node. 
MNI = MAC of I
th master node for Nth slave node. 
APNI = SI+BID+SN+EN+MN+MNI
h:(h(SI)ْሺBID)ْh(SNሻْሺEN)ْh(MN))ÆMNI
EI = EK (EIْሻ
SI: APNIÆ BID
c) P4(c) = {RPNB, EBN, MBN, EBI, MBI}
RPNB = Response of authentication packet of base station. 
EBN = Encrypted packet of base station for N
th slave node. 
MBN = MAC of base station for N
th slave node. 
EBI = Encrypted packet of base station for I
th master node and Nth slave node. 
MBI = MAC of base station for I
th master node and Nth slave node. 
RPNB = BID+SI+EBI+MBI
If MNI=h(h(SI)ْሺBID)ْh(SNሻْሺEN)ْh(MN))
DK(EIْሻÆ
RN = ENْْ
EBN = RN
h:(h(BID)ْh(SN)ْሺSI)ْሺEBN))Æ MBN
EBI= SNْEBNْMBN
h:(h(SI)ْሺBID)ْh(SNሻْ(RN)ْሺEBN)) Æ MBI
EBI = EK (EBIْሻ
BID: RPNBÆ SI
d) P4(d) = {RPIN, KN, ATNI, MANI, EIN, MIN}
RPIN = Response Packet of I
th master node for Nth slave node. 
KNI = Encryption key for N
th slave node from Ith master node. 
ATNI = Authentication Ticket of Nth slave node from I
th master node. 
MANI = MAC for authentication ticket of N
th slave node from Ith master node. 
EIN = Encrypted packet of I
th master node for Nth slave node. 
MIN = MAC of I
th master node for Nth slave node. 
RPIN = SI+SN+EBN+MBN+EIN+MIN
If MBN = h(h(SI)ْሺBID)ْh(SNሻْ(RN) )ْሺEBN))
DK(EBIْሻÆEBI
ൌEBIْSN
KNI = KF (RIْሻ
ATNI = TIْْKNI
h: (h(SN)ْሺATNI))ÆMANI
EIN = ATNIْMANIْTI
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h:(h(SI)ْh(SNሻْሺ)ْሺEIN))ÆMIN
EBN = EK (EBNْሻ
Here,KF = One way key derivation function. 
SI: RPINÆSN
e) P4(e) = {ACKNI, MAI}
ACKNI = Acknowledgment packet of N
th slave node for authentication ticket. 
MAI = MAC of N
th slave node for Ith slave node. 
ACKNI = SN+SI+MAI
If MIN = h(h(SI)ْh(SNሻْሺ)ْሺEIN)) 
DK(EBNْሻÆEBN
h: (h(SN)ْh(SI)ْh(RN)ْh(R1)) ÆMAI
SN: ACKNIÆ SI
5. Stage 4: P5 = {P5(a), P5(b), P5(c)}
Where,P5 = Secondary authentication of slave node. 
a) P5(a) = {APNJ, MNJ}
APNJ = Authentication Packet of N
th slave node for re-authentication. 
MNJ = MAC of N
th slave node for re-authentication. 
APNJ = SN+SJ+ATNI+MANI+MNJ
DK (EJْሻÆ
h:(h(SN)ْh(SJ)ْሺATNI)ْሺMANI)ْh(EJ))Æ MNJ
SN: APNJÆSJ
b) P5(b) ={RPJN, KNJ, ATNJ, MANJ, EJN, MJN, MRJ}
RPJN = Response Packet of J
th slave node for re-authentication. 
KNJ = Encryption key for N
th slave node from Jth master node. 
ATNJ = Authentication Ticket of Nth slave node from J
th master node. 
MANJ = MAC for authentication ticket of N
th slave node from Jth master node. 
EJN = Encrypted packet of J
th master node for Nth slave node. 
MRJ = MAC of J
th master node for encryption key. 
MJN = MAC of J
th master node for Nth slave node. 
RPJN = SJ+SN+EJN+MJN
KNJ = KF (RJْሻ
ATNJ = ْKNJ
h:(h(SN)ْሺATNJ))ÆMANJ
h:(h(KNJ)ْሺRJ))Æ MRJ
EJN = RJْMRJْATNJْMANJ
h:(h(SN)ْሺሻْሺMANJ))ÆMJN
SID2: RRTÆNID1
c) P5(c) ={ACKNJ, MAJ}
ACKNI = Acknowledgment packet of N
th slave node for re-authentication ticket. 
MAI = MAC of N
th slave node for Jth slave node. 
ACKNJ = SN+SJ+MAJ
If ATNJൌْKNJ
h:(h(SN)ْሺሻْሺRN)ْሺRJ)) Æ MAJ
SN: ACKNJÆSJ
4. Performance evaluation and result analysis 
Maintain a key freshness is a prime need of security and to prevent various types of harmful attacks. In our 
proposed protocol framework, we have used a technique of random nonce generator to maintain key freshness in 
wireless sensor network. In our scheme at each and every stage we have generated a random numbers. In stage 0, 
master nodes broadcast a packet which contains a random number which maintains a uniqueness of broadcasted 
packet. In stage 1, master node generates a packet for verification purpose and later on to generate integrity keys 
which contains random numbers. In stage 2, when master nodes wants to share authentication keys with its 
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neighboring master nodes contains a seed value nothing but a random number. Similarly, we have used random 
numbers for primary and secondary authentication of slave nodes as described in stage 3 and 4 of our proposed 
protocol framework.  
Confidentiality of data aggregation and dissemination is another important issue in wireless sensor networks. We 
have used a MAChash Code (MAC) in each stage of our proposed protocol framework to verifying confidentiality 
of transmitted packets in wireless sensor network. If an intruder tampers the packet in between nodes 
communication, MAC hash code will change its values and at receiver side it will not verify at all. 
In our proposed protocol framework when slave node is primarily authenticated by a master node, the slave node 
obtains an authentication ticket. As slave node moves from its location and ask for the re-authentication to 
neighboring master node, slave node verifies its authentication ticket from new master node. On successful 
verification master node provides a new authentication ticket to the slave node. Our technique reduces the work load 
of base station and respective number of routing control packets. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a protocol framework for secure routing layer communication and key 
distribution in mobile WSN and its respective mathematical model. Basically mathematical model gives us a proper 
flow of system. Proposed framework is focused on routing overhead in comparison with DSR protocol which gives 
overall flexible result. 
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